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One	  year	  later,	  whither	  the	  Arab	  Spring?	  Domestic	  and	  regional	  challenges	  	  Cédric	  Dupont	  and	  Florence	  Passy	  Graduate	  Institute	  of	  International	  and	  Development	  Studies,	  Geneva	  University	  of	  Lausanne	  	  In	  the	  previous	  issue	  of	  the	  SPSR,	  we	  asked	  a	  set	  of	  prominent	  scholars	  to	  discuss	  and	  revisit	   several	  of	   the	  key	  pillars	  of	   social	  movement	   theory.	  We	  did	   this	   in	   light	  of	   the	  events	   that	   led	   to	   the	   end	   of	   authoritarian	   regimes	   in	   Tunisia,	   Egypt	   and	   Libya	   and	  threatened	  several	  other	  regimes	  in	  the	  Maghreb	  and	  the	  Gulf.	  In	  this	  issue,	  written	  one	  year	  after	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Ben	  Ali	  regime	  in	  Tunisia,	  we	  consider	  some	  of	  the	  key	  domestic	  and	  regional	  issues	  and	  challenges	  that	  have	  been	  revealed	  by	  the	  Arab	  Spring.	  	  	  
Domestic	  economic	  perspectives:	  from	  despair	  to	  hope?	  	  	  Dire	   economic	   conditions	   for	   a	   widening	   part	   of	   the	   population	  were	   a	   key	   factor	   in	  people's	  willingness	   to	  risk	   their	   lives	  and	  confront	  authoritarian	  regimes.	  To	  stop	  the	  diffusion	   process	   or	   mitigate	   its	   effects,	   governments	   across	   the	   regions	   have	   all	  resorted	  to	  economic	  populism.	  By	  this	  we	  mean	  that	  they	  have	  used	  a	  range	  of	  actions	  to	  lower	  prices	  on	  basic	  food	  and	  utilities	  and,	  even	  more	  importantly,	  to	  create	  jobs	  and	  raise	  the	  salaries	  of	  state	  employees.	  Such a reaction seems to have appeased the situation 
in the short term, thus confirming the strength of the economic factor beneath the 
mobilization of protest. However, there remains a key question about the sustainability of this 
measure, and the long-term relationship between democratization and economic development. 
This is the focus of the contribution by Oliver Schlumberger and Torsten Matzke. In terms of 
sustainability, one must draw a clear distinction between countries that have been able to tap 
into revenues from natural resources (Algeria, Gulf states) and those that have largely used 
deficit spending (Morocco, Jordan, Tunisia, Egypt) to finance state jobs and salaries. For the 
latter, we know from examples in other parts of the world, most notably in Latin America, 
that there is a significant risk of ending up in sovereign debt crisis and more severe economic 
and social pain unless there is massive foreign help (in the form of grants rather than loans). 
So far, such foreign help has remained limited and is unlikely to rise significantly given the 
economic context that traditional donor countries have themselves been facing. Beyond the 
public financial constraints affecting donors, however, the issue of who should be helped is 
also likely to be a bone of contention. As recent initiatives by the European Union show, 
outside financial help is likely to target the private sector, small and medium enterprises, 
rather than contribute to the further bloating of the state, which as a result of the revolutions 
has become even more central than before. The situation looks easier for governments with 
natural resources with revenues that are unlikely to decline in the medium term. Yet, social 
stability will require a significant redistribution effort that could challenge the established 
elite to an extent it deems unacceptable, pushing governments to fiercely resist any change.  
As argued by Schlumberger and Matzke in their contribution to this debate, democratization 
and/or long-term social stability are unlikely if civil society is not significantly included in 
perspectives on economic development. The reactions of existing economic elites, who have 
been used to massive benefits over the last decades, are uncertain but unlikely to be 
cooperative. In countries where such elites are tightly connected to armed forces, such as in 
Egypt, this may well lead to serious reversals of the processes set in motion one year ago. 
Thus, while the economy, with additional help from the great global recession, may well have 
contributed to the blossoming of the Arab Spring, it may also put a quick, and nasty, end to an 
immense wave of hope. 
Individual freedom: change or continuity or both? 
 As	  much	  as	  economic	  factors	  have	  mattered,	  aspirations	  of	  political	  freedom	  have	  been	  a	  formidable	  driver	  behind	  the	  protest.	  Hence	  to	  meet	  expectations,	  new	  governing	  bodies	  in	  Tunisia	  and	  Egypt,	  and	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent	  in	  Libya,	  have	  been	  keen	  to	  proceed	  quickly	  to	  elections.	   In	  other	  countries	   too	   there	  has	  been	  strong	  pressure	   towards	  new,	   freer	  and	   fairer	   opportunities	   for	   voters.	   As	   emphasized	   in	  Ellen	   Lust's	   contribution	   to	   this	  debate,	  there	  is	  reason	  for	  optimism:	  elections	  seem	  to	  have	  been	  free	  and	  fair	  and	  have	  succeeded	   in	   attracting	  wide	   spectrums	  of	   the	  population	   to	   the	  polls.	  They	  have	  also	  brought	  to	  the	  forefront	  parties	  that	  were	  either	  previously	  banned	  from	  participating	  in	  elections,	   or	   severely	   disadvantaged.	   And,	   they	   have	   been	   seen	   as	   a	   way	   to	   define	  countries'	  political	  and	  economic	  futures,	  most	  ostensibly	  in	  Tunisia.	  So,	  clearly	  the	  Arab	  Spring	  has	  brought	  change.	  Yet,	  Ellen	  Lust	  also	  points	   to	  some	  continuity.	   Indeed	  as	   it	  was	  the	  case	  before	  these	  revolutionary	  processes,	  elections	  were	  also	  used	  as	  a	  way	  to	  ensure	   access	   to	   state	   resources.	   Furthermore,	   elections	   have	   failed	   to	   rally	   all	   those	  who	  occupied	  the	  streets,	  leading	  for	  instance	  to	  a	  highly	  polarized	  situation	  in	  Egypt.	  	  It	  also	  remains	  to	  be	  seen	  whether	  voters'	  expectations	  of	  those	  they	  elected	  will	  be	  met.	  In	   the	   affirmative	   case,	   electoral	   dynamics	   will	   have	   contributed	   to	   the	   furthering	   of	  democratization.	  Otherwise,	  they	  may	  well	  have	  negative	  consequences.	  	  One	   key	   issue	   facing	   newly	   elected	   politicians	   will	   be	   the	   place	   and	   role	   of	  religion	   in	   newly	   democratic	   societies.	   Mirjam	   Künkler's	   contribution	   to	   this	   debate	  approaches	   this	   issue	   in	   a	   comparative	   perspective,	   using	   as	   benchmarks	   five	  Muslim	  countries	   that	   have	   undergone	   successful	   democratization	   processes	   –	   Mali,	   Senegal,	  Indonesia,	  Turkey	  and	  Albania.	  To	  many	  less	  acute	  observers	  of	  these	  countries,	  Turkey	  would	   be	   the	   natural	   place	   to	   look	   for	   a	  model	   democratic	   state-­‐religion	   relationship.	  But	   for	   Künkler	   such	   a	   model	   would	   be	   overly	   similar	   to	   the	   situation	   prevailing	   in	  Tunisia	   and	   Egypt	   before	   the	   revolutions.	   	   Then,	   states	   interfered	   deeply	   in	   religious	  affairs	  and	  thus,	  democratization	  requires	  significant	  state	  deregulation	  of	  religion.	  The	  source	  of	   inspiration,	  according	  to	  Künkler,	   is	  not	  Turkey	  but	  rather	  Mali	  and	  Senegal.	  There	  is	  reason	  to	  doubt	  that	  elected	  politicians	  will	  follow	  this	  path.	  Electoral	  debates	  have	   highlighted	   continued	   strong	   attachment	   to	   the	   primacy	   of	   state	   laws	   governing	  religion,	   rather	   than	   laws	   attached	   to	   the	   guarantee	   of	   individual	   rights	   including	  religious	  freedom.	  	  	  
The	  (international)	  regional	  dimension:	  more	  of	  the	  same	  things?	  	  With	   the	   contagion	   of	   revolutionary	   processes	   seemingly	   on	   hold,	   it	   is	   time	   to	   draw	  some	   tentative	   lessons	   on	   the	   consequences	   of	   domestic	   changes	   on	   the	   regional	  landscape.	   In	   this	   debate	   we	   consider	   three	   dimensions	   of	   possible	   change.	   The	   first	  relates	   to	   the	   role	   of	   the	   European	   Union,	   the	   dominant	   economic	   magnet	   and	  democratic	   role	   model	   in	   the	   region.	   The	   second	   dimension	   focuses	   on	   the	   possible	  repercussions	  of	   the	  Arab	   Spring	  on	   the	   Israeli-­‐Palestine	   conflict	  writ	   large.	  The	   third	  addresses	  normative	  changes	  in	  how	  regional	  actors	  understand	  their	  responsibility	  to	  protect	  individual	  human	  rights	  against	  flagrant	  domestic	  violations.	  	  The	  Arab	   Spring	   could	  not	   have	   come	   at	   a	  worse	   time	   for	   the	  European	  Union	  struggling	  with	  the	  worst	  crisis	  since	  its	  creation.	  In	  such	  a	  context,	  there	  was	  little	  hope	  of	  expecting	  bold	  initiatives	  in	  foreign	  policy,	  or	  a	  major	  re-­‐thinking	  of	  the	  form	  of	  tools	  able	   to	   help	   reconstruction	   challenges	   abroad.	   From	   this	   perspective,	   EU	   action	   or	  inaction	  has	  not	  come	  as	  a	  surprise.	  As	  Ruth	  Hanau	  Santini	  argues	  in	  her	  contribution	  to	  
this	  debate,	   the	  EU	  has	  not	  been	  able	  to	  remedy	  its	   lack	  of	  a	  comprehensive	  vision	  for	  the	   region	   and	   has	   often	   failed	   to	   bypass	   the	   post-­‐colonial	   economic	   and	   political	  interests	  of	  some	  of	  its	  big	  members.	  It	  has	  offered	  some	  economic	  and	  financial	  help	  to	  the	  private	  sector,	   in	  particular	  via	  the	  European	  Investment	  Bank,	  and	  has	  created	  an	  endowment	  for	  the	  promotion	  of	  democracy.	  But	  the	  amounts	  have	  been	  dwarfed	  both	  by	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  region	  and	  by	  the	  promises	  made	  by	  broader	  multilateral	  initiatives.	  Yet,	  even	  more	  worrisome,	  the	  EU	  has	  failed	  to	  consider	  local	  specificities	  and	  been	  keen	  to	  promote	  European	  values	  and	  models	  in	  countries	  very	  different	  from	  the	  traditional	  membership	  of	   the	  EU.	  Nowhere	  has	   this	  been	  more	  evident	   than	   in	   attitudes	   toward	  political	  forces	  with	  clear	  Islamic	  standing.	  More	  broadly,	  the	  advent	  of	  the	  Arab	  Spring	  has	   not	   altered	   the	   EU's	   obsession	   with	   the	   Middle	   East	   peace	   process	   and	   with	   the	  behavior	  of	  Iran,	  two	  issues	  on	  which	  it	  is	  unlikely	  to	  make	  any	  significant	  difference	  in	  the	   near	   future.	   In	   sum,	   it	   seems	   that	   the	   EU	   has	   not	   yet	   seized	   the	   formidable	  opportunities	  for	  regional	  influence	  opened	  by	  the	  Arab	  Spring,	  and	  not	  reconsidered	  its	  flawed	  priorities	  in	  the	  region.	  Turning	   to	   the	   impact	   of	   the	   Arab	   Spring	   on	   Israel-­‐Palestine	   relations,	   Ravi	  Bhavnani	  and	  Karsten	  Donnay	  argue	  in	  their	  contribution	  that	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  see	  any	  direct	  connection	   between	   revolutionary	   processes	   in	   Arab	   countries	   and	   violence	   between	  Israelis	   and	  Palestinians.	  One	  exception	  has	  been	   the	   sporadic	   emergence	  of	  unarmed	  protest	  against	  Israel,	  which	  has	  posed	  a	  new,	  important	  challenge	  to	  the	  Israeli	  Army.	  Although	   it	   is	  difficult	   to	  predict	  what	  direction	   future	   influences	  will	   take,	   the	   turn	  of	  events	  in	  Egypt	  and	  Syria	  will	  weigh	  heavily	  on	  Israel's	  situation	  in	  the	  region.	  From	  this	  perspective,	   it	   is	   not	   hard	   to	   understand	   the	   cautious	   attitude	   of	   outside	   powers,	  including	  Western	  ones,	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  violent	  repression	  in	  Syria.	  The	  same	  powers	  may	  well	  be	  tempted	  to	  limit	  change	  in	  Egypt	  and	  to	  help	  keep	  the	  army	  as	  the	  cornerstone	  of	  society.	   Such	   strategies	   may	   well	   backfire,	   however,	   with	   potentially	   worse	  consequences	  than	  the	  choice	  of	  a	  more	  change-­‐oriented	  attitude.	  The	  last	  contribution	  to	  this	  debate,	  by	  Oliver	  Jütersonke	  and	  Stephanie	  Hofmann,	  looks	   at	   the	   concept	   of	   the	   responsibility	   to	   protect	   (R2P),	   coined	   in	   2001	   by	   the	  International	  Commission	  on	  Intervention	  and	  State	  Sovereignty	  (ICISS).	  R2P	  was	  taken	  up	   and	   expanded	   between	   2005	   and	   2009	   in	   various	   United	   Nations	   venues	   and	  documents,	  but	  rose	  to	  prominence	  when	  applied	  under	  Resolutions	  1970	  and	  1973	  on	  the	  situation	  in	  Libya.	  Is	  normative	  change	  underway,	  and	  will	  outside	  interventions	  be	  dictated	  by	  a	  widely	  shared	  sense	  of	  obligation	  to	  protect	  populations	  both	  at	  home	  and	  abroad?	   Jütersonke	   and	   Hofmann	   offer	   a	   very	   skeptical	   answer,	   pointing	   to	   the	  ambiguity	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   R2P	   and	   how	   it	   can	   be	   tailored	   to	   fit	   different	   strategic	  objectives	  and	  contexts.	  The	  striking	  variation	  in	  response	  to	  the	  repression	  of	  protest	  in	  Libya	   and	   Syria	   raises	   the	   question	   of	   what	   is	   driving	   foreign	   policy	   in	  major	   states.	  There	   is	   surely	   no	   overwhelming	   sense	   of	   a	   legal	   responsibility	   to	   protect	   that	  would	  supersede	   strategic	   political	   and	   economic	   interests.	   Equally	   revealing	   has	   been	   the	  seemingly	   double	   standard	   of	   the	   European	  Union	   regarding	   the	   protection	   of	   Libyan	  and	  Tunisian	  citizens.	  Calls	  for	  protection	  have	  been	  stronger	  when	  it	  came	  to	  action	  on	  African	  soils	  than	  when	  it	  pertained	  to	  European	  waters.	  	  	  In	   sum,	   the	   Arab	   Spring	   has	   sent	   formidable,	   and	   largely	   unanticipated,	  shockwaves	   across	   established	   orders	   in	   the	   Middle	   East	   and	   North	   African	   (MENA)	  region.	   Its	  specific	   lasting	  consequences,	  both	  at	   the	  domestic	  and	   international	   levels,	  will	   remain	   elusive	   for	   quite	   some	   time	   to	   most	   observers	   and	   analysts.	   We	   hope,	  however,	   that	   this	   second	   round	   of	   debate	  will	   contribute	   to	   an	   improvement	   of	   our	  
understanding	  of	   the	  many	   challenges	   and	  opportunities	   created	  by	   the	   revolutionary	  processes	  in	  Arab	  countries.	  
